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Abstract
We introduce a symbolic characterisation of the operational semantics of COWS, a formal language for
specifying and combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. This
alternative semantics avoids inﬁnite representations of COWS terms due to the value-passing nature of
communication in COWS and is more amenable for automatic manipulation by analytical tools, such as
e.g. equivalence and model checkers. We illustrate our approach through a ‘translation service’ scenario.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the increasing success of e-business, e-learning, e-government, and
other similar emerging models, has led the World Wide Web, initially thought of
as a system for human use, to evolve towards an architecture for service-oriented
computing (SOC) supporting automated use. SOC advocates the use of loosely
coupled ‘services’, to be understood as autonomous, platform-independent, com-
putational entities that can be described, published, discovered, and assembled, as
the basic blocks for building interoperable and evolvable systems and applications.
While early examples of technologies that are at least partly service-oriented date
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back to CORBA, DCOM, J2EE and IBM WebSphere, the most successful instan-
tiation of the SOC paradigm are probably the more recent web services. These are
sets of operations that can be published, located and invoked through the Web via
XML messages complying with given standard formats. To support the web service
approach, several new languages and technologies have been designed and many
international companies have invested a lot of eﬀorts.
Current software engineering technologies for SOC, however, remain at the de-
scriptive level and lack rigorous formal foundations. We are still experiencing a gap
between practice (programming) and theory (formal methods and analysis tech-
niques) in the design of SOC applications. The challenges come from the necessity
of dealing at once with such issues as asynchronous interactions, concurrent ac-
tivities, workﬂow coordination, business transactions, failures, resource usage, and
security, in a setting where demands and guarantees can be very diﬀerent for the
many diﬀerent components. Many researchers have hence put forward the idea of
using process calculi, a cornerstone of current foundational research on speciﬁcation
and analysis of concurrent, distributed and mobile systems through mathematical
— mainly algebraic and logical — tools. Indeed, due to their algebraic nature,
process calculi convey in a distilled form the compositional programming style of
SOC. Thus, many process calculi have been designed (e.g. [9,8,16,13,10,15,4,6,27]),
addressing one aspect or another of SOC and aiming at assessing the adequacy of
diverse sets of primitives w.r.t. modelling, combining and analysing service-oriented
applications.
By taking inspiration from well-known process calculi and from the standard
language for orchestration of web services WS-BPEL [22], in [17] we have designed
COWS (Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services), a process calculus for spec-
ifying and combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic
behaviour. We have shown that COWS can model and handle distinctive features
of (web) services, such as, e.g., correlation-based communication, compensation
activities, service instances and interactions among them, race conditions among
service instances and service deﬁnitions.
A major beneﬁt of using process calculi is that they enjoy a rich repertoire of
elegant meta-theories, proof techniques and analytical tools that can be likely tai-
lored to the needs of SOC. Concerning this, in [12] we have developed a logic and
a model checker to express and check functional properties of services speciﬁed in
COWS, while in [24] we have studied observational semantic theories for COWS.
However, such tools suﬀer from a lack of compositionality and eﬃciency. Indeed,
generally speaking, model and equivalence checkers, and other similar veriﬁcation
tools, do not work directly on syntactic speciﬁcations but rather on abstract repre-
sentations of the behaviour of processes. Thus, for value-passing languages, such as
COWS, using an inappropriate representation can lead to unfeasible veriﬁcations.
Indeed, according to the COWS’s original operational semantics, if the communi-
cable values range over an inﬁnite value set (e.g. natural numbers and strings), the
behaviour of a service that performs a receive activity is modelled by an inﬁnite
abstract representation. Such representation is a Labelled Transition System whose
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initial state has inﬁnite outgoing edges, each labelled with an input label having a
diﬀerent value as argument and leading to a diﬀerent state.
Hence, by taking inspiration from Hennessy and Lin [14], in this paper we deﬁne
a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. Diﬀerently from the symbolic seman-
tics for more standard calculi, such as value-passing CCS or π-calculus, ours deals
at once with, besides receive transitions, a number of complex features, such as, e.g.,
generation and exportation of fresh names, pattern-matching, expressions evalua-
tion, and priorities among conﬂicting receives. The new semantics avoids inﬁnite
representations of COWS terms due to the value-passing nature of communication
in COWS and associates a ﬁnite representation to each ﬁnite COWS term. It is
then more amenable for automatic manipulation by analytical tools, such as e.g.
equivalence and model checkers. Our major result is a theorem of ‘operational cor-
respondence’. We prove that, under appropriate conditions, any transition of the
original semantics can be generated using the symbolic one, and vice versa. In gen-
eral, however, additional transitions can be derived using the symbolic semantics
since it also accounts for services ability to interact with the environment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some motivations
for the symbolic semantics of COWS; this is done by means of an ‘Italian-English
translation service’ scenario that is used also to informally describe in a step-by-
step fashion the main features of COWS. Section 3 presents the original syntax
and operational semantics of COWS. Section 4 introduces the symbolic variant of
the operational semantics of COWS and our major results, together with some
clarifying examples. Section 5 shows an extension of the symbolic semantics for
dealing with polyadic communication. Finally, Section 6 touches upon comparisons
with related work and directions for future work.
2 A ‘translation service’ scenario
In this section, we presentCOWS main features and syntax in a step-by-step fashion
while modelling an Italian-English translation service. By means of this scenario, we
discuss some veriﬁcation problems and present the major intuitions underlying the
symbolic operational semantics for COWS. For the time being, we use a monadic
variant of COWS, i.e. we assume that invoke and receive activities can carry one
single parameter at a time. In fact, for the sake of presentation, the symbolic
semantics is introduced for the monadic variant in Section 4, and is then extended
to polyadic communication in Section 5.
Let us consider a service that provides to its customers an Italian-English trans-
lation service. Speciﬁcally, when the service is invoked by a customer, that commu-
nicates ﬁrst her partner name and then an Italian word, it replies to the request with
either the corresponding English word or the string “unknown word”. A high-level
speciﬁcation of the service can be rendered in COWS as follows:
[x] t • req?x . [y] t •word?y . x • resp!trans(y) (1)
where t is the translation service partner name, req , word and resp are operation
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names, x and y are variables that store the customer partner name and the Italian
word to be translated respectively, and trans( ) is a total function that maps a large
subset of Italian words to the corresponding English ones and returns the string
“unknown word” for all words that do not appear in the Italian words set. The
service simply performs a sequence of two receive activities t • req?x and t •word?y,
corresponding to reception of a request and of an Italian word sent by a customer,
and replies with the translated word, by invoking the operation resp of the customer
by means of the invoke activity x • resp!trans(y). Receives and invokes are the basic
communication activities provided by COWS. Besides input parameters and sent
values, they indicate the endpoint, i.e. a pair p • o made of a partner name p and an
operation name o, through which the communication should occur. Diﬀerently from
most process calculi, receive activities in COWS bind neither names nor variables.
The only binding construct is delimitation: [e] s binds the delimited element e in
the scope s (the notions of bound and free occurrences of a delimited element are
deﬁned accordingly). For example, the service (1) uses the delimitation operator to
declare the scope of variables x and y. An inter-service communication takes place
when the arguments of a receive and of a concurrent invoke along the same endpoint
do match, and causes replacement of the variables arguments of the receive with
the corresponding values arguments of the invoke (within the scope of variables
declarations). For example, variable x will be initialised by the ﬁrst receive activity
with data provided by a customer.
At a lower level, the service could be described in terms of three entities com-
posed by using the parallel composition operator | that allows them to be concur-
rently executed and to interact with each other. A low-level COWS speciﬁcation
of the translation service can be
[reqDB1 , reqDB2 , respDB1 , respDB2 ] (Translator | DB1 | DB2 ) (2)
The delimitation operator is used here to declare that reqDB1 , reqDB2 , respDB1
and respDB2 are private operation names known to the three components
Translator , DB1 and DB2 , and only to them (at least initially, since during a
computation private names can be exported exactly as in π-calculus). The three
subservices are deﬁned as follows:
Translator  [x] t • req?x . [y] t •word?y .
[k] ( t • reqDB1 !y | [x1] t • respDB1 ?x1 . (kill(k) | {|x • resp!x1|} )
| t • reqDB2 !y | [x2] t • respDB2 ?x2 . (kill(k) | {|x • resp!x2|} ) )
DB1  t • reqDB1?“a”. t • respDB1 !“to”
+ t • reqDB1 ?“albero”. t • respDB1 !“tree”
+ . . . + t • reqDB1?“zucca”. t • respDB1 !“pumpkin”
DB2  [z] ( t • reqDB2?z. t • respDB2 !“unknown word”
+ t • reqDB2?“a”. t • respDB2 !“to”
+ t • reqDB2?“abate”. t • respDB2 !“abbot”
+ . . . + t • reqDB2?“zuppo”. t • respDB2 !“soaked” )
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Service Translator is publicly invocable and can interact with customers other than
with the ‘internal’ services DB1 and DB2 . These latter two services, instead, can
only be invoked by Translator (indeed, all the operations used by them are re-
stricted) and have the task of looking up in databases the English word correspond-
ing to a given Italian one and replying accordingly. In particular, DB1 performs a
quick search in a small database of commonly used words, while DB2 performs a
slower search in a bigger database (that exactly corresponds to that modelled by
the function trans( )). After the two initial receives, for e.g. performance or fault
tolerance purposes, Translator invokes services DB1 and DB2 concurrently. When
one of them replies, Translator immediately stops the other search. This is done by
executing the kill activity kill(k), that forces termination of all unprotected par-
allel terms inside the enclosing [k] , that stops the killing eﬀect. Then, Translator
forwards the response to the customer and terminates. Kill activities are executed
eagerly with respect to the other parallel activities but critical code can be protected
from the eﬀect of a forced termination by using the protection operator {| |}; this is
indeed the case of the response x • resp!x1 in our example. Services DB1 and DB2
use the choice operator + to oﬀer alternative behaviours: one of them can be
selected by executing an invoke matching the receive leading the behaviour. In case
the word to be translated is unknown, DB1 does not reply, while DB2 returns the
string “unknown word”. Indeed, the semantics of parallel composition avoids that
DB2 returns “unknown word” in case of known words. This is done by assigning
the receive t • reqDB2?z less priority than the other receive activities, so that it is
only executed when none of the other receives matches the word to be translated
(see Section 3 for further details about the prioritised semantics of COWS).
Now, the point is that equivalence and model checkers, and other similar veri-
ﬁcation tools, do not work directly on syntactic speciﬁcations such as those above,
but rather on more abstract representations of the behaviour of processes. Thus,
using an inappropriate representation can lead to unfeasible veriﬁcations. In the
rest of the section, we discuss veriﬁcation problems and how to cope with them by
exploiting a symbolic approach.
Veriﬁcation problems. When the considered speciﬁcation language is a value-
passing process algebra and the value-space is inﬁnite, using standard Labelled
Transition Systems (LTSs) for the semantics can lead to inﬁnite representations.
For example, the operational behaviour of service (1) can be represented by the
inﬁnite LTS in the left-hand side of Figure 1, where nodes denote states and edges
denote transitions between states implicitly oriented from top to bottom. Notably,
for the sake of presentation, the LTSs shown in the ﬁgures rely on an operational
semantics in early style, where substitutions are applied when receive actions are
inferred. However, the problem of inﬁnite representations remains also in case of late
semantics, due to the fact that the continuation of a receive action with argument
a variable x has to be considered under all possible substitutions for x.
The symbolic approach. To tackle the problems above, in [14] Hennessy and Lin
have introduced the so-called symbolic LTSs and used them to deﬁne ﬁnite seman-
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Fig. 1. LTS and symbolic LTS for the translation service (high-level speciﬁcation)
tical representations of terms of the value-passing CCS. For example, the symbolic
LTSs corresponding to the COWS service (1) is shown in the right-hand side of Fig-
ure 1. The symbolic actions t • req?x and t • word?y denote reception of unknown
values x and y along endpoints t • req and t • word, respectively; the condition-
guarded symbolic action (z = trans(y) , x • resp!z) denotes sending of an unknown
value z such that z = trans(y). Of course, for the same reasons, also the LTS rep-
resenting the behaviour of service (2) is inﬁnite, while the corresponding symbolic
LTS is ﬁnite. Indeed, if for the sake of presentation we assume that database DB1
contains only the association for word “a” and database DB2 contains only the
associations for “a” and “abate”, the symbolic LTS representing (2) is that shown
in Figure 2.
Applying the symbolic approach to COWS.The main contribution of this work
is the development of a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. To achieve this
goal, the main issue is to give receive activities a proper semantics, because variables
in their arguments are placeholders for something to be received. For example, let
us consider the service p • o?x.s. If p • o?x.s
p •o?x
−−−−−→ s then the behaviour of
the continuation service s must be considered under all substitutions of the form
{x → v} (i.e. the semantics of s can intuitively be thought of as a function λx. s
from values to services). In case of the standard semantics for π-calculus [21], for
example, this problem is not tackled at the operational semantics level, but it is
postponed to the observational semantics level. In fact, in the deﬁnition of late
bisimulation for π-calculus, whenever P is bisimilar to Q, if P
a(x)
−−−−→ P ′ then there
is Q′ such that Q
a(x)
−−−−→ Q′ and P ′{u/x} is bisimilar to Q′{u/x} for every u. Thus,
continuations P ′ and Q′ are considered under all substitutions for x. Instead, here
we aim at deﬁning an operational semantics for COWS that properly handles input
transitions, and allow ﬁnite state LTSs to be associated to ﬁnite COWS terms.
The basic idea is to allow receive activities to evolve by performing a communi-
cation with the ‘external world’ (i.e. a COWS context), this way they do not need
to synchronise with invoke activities within the considered term. To avoid inﬁnite
branching (as in the case of early operational semantics), we replace variables with
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Fig. 2. Symbolic LTS for the (simpliﬁed) translation service (low-level speciﬁcation)
unknown values rather than with speciﬁc values. We denote by x the unknown
value that replaces the variable x. This way, the term [x] ( p • o?x. q • o′!x ) can
evolve as follows:
[x] ( p • o?x. q • o′!x )
p •o ?[x]
−−−−−−→ q • o′!x
q •o′!x
−−−−−→ 0
Also receive activities having a value as argument (e.g. p • o?v) and invoke activities
(e.g. p • o!v) can evolve by communicating with the external world. Of course, these
kinds of communication do not produce substitutions.
When an external communication takes place, the behaviour of the continuation
service depends on the admittable values for the unknown value. To take care of
the real values that the unknown values can assume, we deﬁne a symbolic semantics
for COWS, where the label on each transition has two components: the condition
that must hold for the transition to be enabled and, as usual, the action of the
transition. Moreover, to store the conditions that must hold to reach a state and
the names exported along the path, we deﬁne the semantics over conﬁgurations of
the form Φ,Δ  s, called constrained services, where the condition Φ and the set of
names Δ are used to determine the actions that s can perform. Thus, the symbolic
transitions are of the form Φ,Δ  s1 
Φ′, α
−−−−→ Φ′,Δ′  s2, meaning “if the condition
Φ′ (such that Φ is a subterm of Φ′) holds then s1 can perform the action α leading
to s2 by extending the set of exported private names Δ to the set Δ
′”.
The symbolic LTS associated to a COWS term conveys in a distilled form all the
semantics information on the behaviour of terms. More speciﬁcally, besides receive
transitions, symbolic representations take into account generation and exportation
of fresh names, pattern-matching, expressions evaluation, and priorities among con-
ﬂicting receives. Dealing at once with all the above features at operational semantics
level makes the development of a symbolic semantics for COWS more complex than
for more standard calculi, such as value-passing CCS or π-calculus.
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Killer labels: k, k′, . . . Elements (i.e. Killer labels/Variables/Names): e, e′, . . .
Expressions: , ′, . . . Variables/Names: u, u′, . . .
Variables: x, y, . . . Variables/Values: w, w′, . . .
Values: v, v′, . . .
Names: n, m, . . . Endpoints:
Partners: p, p′, . . . without variables: p• o, . . . , n, m, . . .
Operations: o, o′, . . . may contain variables: u•u′, . . . , u, u′, . . .
Services: Receive-guarded choice:
s ::= g ::=
kill(k) (kill) 0 (nil)
| u• u′!¯ (invoke) | p• o?w¯.s (request processing)
| g (receive-guarded choice) | g + g (choice)
| s | s (parallel composition)
| {|s|} (protection)
| [e] s (delimitation)
| ∗ s (replication)
Table 1
COWS syntax
3 COWS and its standard operational semantics
COWS (Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services, [17]) is a recently designed pro-
cess calculus for specifying, combining and analyzing service-oriented applications,
while modelling their dynamic behaviour. COWS combines in an original way a
number of ingredients borrowed from well-known process calculi, e.g. asynchronous
communication, polyadic synchronization, pattern matching, protection, delimited
receiving and killing activities, while resulting diﬀerent from any of them. In this
section, we present the standard syntax and operational semantics of COWS. We re-
fer the interested reader to [17] for many examples illustrating COWS peculiarities
and expressiveness, and for comparisons with other process-based and orchestration
formalisms.
The syntax of COWS is presented in Table 1. It is parameterized by three
countable and pairwise disjoint sets: the set of (killer) labels, the set of values and
the set of ‘write once’ variables. The set of values is left unspeciﬁed; however,
we assume that it includes the set of names, mainly used to represent partners
and operations. The language is also parameterized by a set of expressions, whose
exact syntax is deliberately omitted. We just assume that expressions contain, at
least, values and variables, but do not include killer labels that, hence, are non-
communicable values. This way the scope of killer labels cannot be dynamically
extended and the activities whose termination would be forced by execution of a kill
can be statically determined. Partner names and operation names can be combined
to designate communication endpoints, written p • o, and can be communicated,
but dynamically received names can only be used for service invocation (as in Lπ
[20]). Indeed, communication endpoints of receive activities are identiﬁed statically
because their syntax only allows using names and not variables. Notice also that,
to model asynchronous communication, invoke activities cannot be used as preﬁxes
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and choice can only be guarded by receive activities (as in asynchronous π-calculus
[1]).
Notation ·¯ stands for tuples of objects, e.g. x¯ is a compact notation for denoting
the tuple of variables 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 (with n ≥ 0). We assume that variables in the
same tuple are pairwise distinct. All notations shall extend to tuples component-
wise. We adopt the following conventions about the operators precedence: monadic
operators bind more tightly than parallel composition, and preﬁxing more tightly
than choice. In the sequel, we shall use n to range over communication endpoints
that do not contain variables (e.g. p • o), and u to range over communication
endpoints that may contain variables (e.g. u •u′). We will omit trailing occurrences
of 0, writing e.g. p • o?w¯ instead of p • o?w¯.0, and write [e1, . . . , en] s in place of
[e1] . . . [en] s. We will write I  s to assign a name I to the term s.
The only binding construct is delimitation: [e] s binds the element e (i.e. either
a killer label, a name or a variable) in the scope s. In fact, to enable concurrent
threads within each service instance to share (part of) the state, receive activities
in COWS bind neither names nor variables, which is diﬀerent from most process
calculi. Instead, the range of application of the substitutions generated by a com-
munication is regulated by the delimitation operator, that additionally permits to
generate fresh names (as the restriction operator of the π-calculus) and to delimit
the ﬁeld of action of kill activities. Thus, the occurrence of an element is free if it
is not under the scope of a delimitation for it. We denote by fk(t) the set of killer
labels that occur free in the term t, and by fe(t) that of free elements in t. Two
terms are alpha-equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by consistently
renaming bound elements. As usual, we identify terms up to alpha-equivalence.
The operational semantics of COWS is deﬁned only for closed services, i.e.
services without free variables/labels, but of course the rules also involve non-closed
services (see e.g. the premises of rules (delcom) and (delkill1)).
Formally, the semantics is given in terms of a structural congruence and of a
labelled transition relation. The structural congruence ≡ identiﬁes syntactically
diﬀerent services that intuitively represent the same service. It is deﬁned as the
least congruence relation induced by a given set of equational laws. We explicitly
show in Table 2 the laws for replication, protection and delimitation, while omit
the (standard) laws for the other operators stating that parallel composition is
commutative, associative and has 0 as identity element, and that guarded choice
enjoys the same properties and, additionally, is idempotent. All the presented
laws are straightforward. In particular, commutativity of consecutive delimitations
implies that the order among the ei in [〈e1, . . . , en〉] s is irrelevant, thus in the sequel
we may use the simpler notation [e1, . . . , en] s. Notably, the last law can be used
to extend the scope of names (like a similar law in the π-calculus), thus enabling
communication of restricted names, except when the argument e of the delimitation
is a free killer label of s2 (this avoids involving s1 in the eﬀect of a kill activity inside
s2 and is essential to statically determine which activities can be terminated by a
kill).
To deﬁne the labelled transition relation, we need a few auxiliary functions.
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∗0 ≡ 0 ∗ s ≡ s | ∗ s {|0|} ≡ 0
{| {|s|} |} ≡ {|s|} {|[e] s|} ≡ [e] {|s|} [e]0 ≡ 0
[e1] [e2] s ≡ [e2] [e1] s s1 | [e] s2 ≡ [e] (s1 | s2) if e /∈ fe(s1)∪fk(s2)
Table 2
COWS structural congruence (excerpt of laws)
M(x, v) = {x → v} M(v, v) = ∅ M(〈〉, 〈〉) = ∅
M(w1, v1) = σ1 M(w¯2, v¯2) = σ2
M((w1, w¯2), (v1, v¯2)) = σ1 unionmulti σ2
Table 3
Matching rules
First, we exploit a function [[ ]] for evaluating closed expressions (i.e. expressions
without variables): it takes a closed expression and returns a value. However, [[ ]]
cannot be explicitly deﬁned because the exact syntax of expressions is deliberately
not speciﬁed.
Then, through the rules in Table 3, we deﬁne the partial function M( , ) that
permits performing pattern-matching on semi-structured data thus determining if
a receive and an invoke over the same endpoint can synchronize. The rules state
that two tuples match if they have the same number of ﬁelds and corresponding
ﬁelds have matching values/variables. Variables match any value, and two values
match only if they are identical. When tuples w¯ and v¯ do match, M(w¯, v¯) returns a
substitution for the variables in w¯; otherwise, it is undeﬁned. Substitutions (ranged
over by σ) are functions mapping variables to values and are written as collections
of pairs of the form x → v. Application of substitution σ to s, written s · σ, has the
eﬀect of replacing every free occurrence of x in s with v, for each x → v ∈ σ, by
possibly using alpha conversion for avoiding v to be captured by name delimitations
within s. We use |σ | to denote the number of pairs in σ and σ1 unionmulti σ2 to denote the
union of σ1 and σ2 when they have disjoint domains.
We also deﬁne a function, named halt( ), that takes a service s as an argument
and returns the service obtained by only retaining the protected activities inside s.
halt( ) is deﬁned inductively on the syntax of services. The most signiﬁcant case is
halt({|s|}) = {|s|}. In the other cases, halt( ) returns 0, except for parallel composi-
tion, delimitation and replication operators, for which it acts as an homomorphism.
halt(kill(k)) = halt(u!¯) = halt(g) = 0 halt({|s|}) = {|s|}
halt(s1 | s2) = halt(s1) | halt(s2) halt([e] s) = [e]halt(s) halt(∗ s) = ∗halt(s)
Finally, in Table 4, we inductively deﬁne two predicates: noKill(s, e) holds true
if either e is not a killer label or e = k and s cannot immediately perform a free
kill activity kill(k); noConf(s, n, v¯, ), with  natural number, holds true if s does
not produce communication conﬂicts, i.e. s cannot immediately perform a receive
activity over the endpoint n which matches v¯ and generates a substitution with
fewer pairs than .
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noKill(s, e) = true if fk(e) = ∅ noKill(s | s′, k) = noKill(s, k) ∧ noKill(s′, k)
noKill(kill(k), k) = false noKill([e] s, k) = noKill(s, k) if e = k
noKill(kill(k′), k) = true if k = k′ noKill([k] s, k) = true
noKill(u!¯, k) = noKill(g, k) = true noKill({|s|}, k) = noKill(∗ s, k) = noKill(s, k)
noConf(kill(k), n, v¯, ) = noConf(u!¯, n, v¯, ) = noConf(0, n, v¯, ) = true
noConf(n′?w¯.s,n, v¯, ) =
j
false if n′ = n ∧ |M(w¯, v¯) |< 
true otherwise
noConf(g + g′, n, v¯, ) = noConf(g, n, v¯, ) ∧ noConf(g′, n, v¯, )
noConf(s | s′, n, v¯, ) = noConf(s, n, v¯, ) ∧ noConf(s′, n, v¯, )
noConf([e] s, n, v¯, ) =
j
noConf(s, n, v¯, ) if e /∈ n
true otherwise
noConf({|s|}, n, v¯, ) = noConf(∗ s, n, v¯, ) = noConf(s, n, v¯, )
Table 4
There are not active kill(k) / There are not conﬂicting receives along n matching v¯
kill(k)
k
−−→ 0 (kill) n?w¯.s
n w¯
−−−−−→ s (rec)
[[¯]] = v¯
(inv)
n!¯
n v¯
−−−−−→ 0
g
α
−−−→ s
(choice)
g + g′
α
−−−→ s
s
nσunionmulti{x →v}  v¯
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(delcom)
[x] s
nσ  v¯
−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x → v}
s
k
−−→ s′
(delkill1)
[k] s
†
−−→ [k] s′
s
k
−−→ s′ k = e
(delkill2)
[e] s
k
−−→ [e] s′
s
†
−−→ s′
(delkill3)
[e] s
†
−−→ [e] s′
s
α
−−−→ s′ e /∈ e(α) α = k, † noKill(s, e)
(del)
[e] s
α
−−−→ [e] s′
s ≡ s1 s1
α
−−−→ s2 s2 ≡ s
′
(cong)
s
α
−−−→ s′
s1
nσ  v¯
−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v¯, )
(parcom)
s1 | s2
nσ  v¯
−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s
α
−−−→ s′
(prot)
{|s|}
α
−−−→ {|s′|}
s1
n w¯
−−−−−→s′1 s2
n v¯
−−−−−→s′2 M(w¯, v¯)=σ noConf(s1 |s2, n, v¯, |σ |)
(com)
s1 | s2
nσ |σ | v¯
−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
k
−−→ s′1
(parkill)
s1 | s2
k
−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s1
α
−−−→ s′1 α = k, nσ  v¯
(par)
s1 | s2
α
−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 5
COWS operational semantics
The labelled transition relation
α
−−→ is the least relation over services induced
by the rules in Table 5, where label α is generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v¯ | n w¯ | nσ  v¯ | k | †
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In the sequel, we use e(α) to denote the set of names, variables and killer labels
occurring in α, except for α = nσ  v¯ for which we let e(nσ  v¯) = e(σ), where
e({x → v}) = {x} ∪ fe(v) and e(σ1 unionmulti σ2) = e(σ1) ∪ e(σ2).
The meaning of labels is as follows: n v¯ and n w¯ denote execution of invoke
and receive activities over the endpoint n, respectively, nσ  v¯ (if σ = ∅) denotes
execution of a communication over n with matching values v¯, generated substitu-
tion having  pairs, and substitution σ to be still applied, k denotes execution of a
request for terminating a term from within the delimitation [k] , † and n ∅  v¯ denote
computational steps corresponding to taking place of forced termination and com-
munication (without pending substitutions), respectively. Hence, a computation
from a closed service s0 is a sequence of connected transitions of the form
s0
α1
−−−→ s1
α2
−−−→ s2
α3
−−−→ s3 . . .
where, for each i, αi is either † or n ∅  v¯ (for some n,  and v¯); services si, for each
i, will be called reducts of s0.
We comment on salient points. Activity kill(k) forces termination of all unpro-
tected parallel activities (rules (kill) and (parkill)) inside an enclosing [k] , that stops
the killing eﬀect by turning the transition label k into † (rule (delkill1)). Existence of
such delimitation is ensured by the assumption that the semantics is only deﬁned
for closed services. Critical code can be protected from killing by putting it into
a protection {| |}; this way, {|s|} behaves like s (rule (prot)). Similarly, [e] s behaves
like s (rule (del)), except when the transition label α contains e, in which case α
must correspond either to a communication assigning a value to e (rule (delcom)) or
to a kill activity for e (rule (delkill1)), or when a free kill activity for e is active in
s, in which case only actions corresponding to kill activities can be executed (rules
(delkill2) and (delkill3), that also apply when the third premise of rule (del) does not
hold, i.e. α = k or α = †). This means that kill activities are executed eagerly with
respect to the activities enclosed within the delimitation of the corresponding killer
label.
A service invocation can proceed only if the expressions in the argument can be
evaluated (rule (inv)). A receive activity oﬀers an invocable operation along a given
partner name (rule (rec)), and the execution of a receive permits to take a decision
between alternative behaviours (rule (choice)). Communication can take place when
two parallel services perform matching receive and invoke activities (rule (com)).
Communication generates a substitution that is recorded in the transition label (for
subsequent application), rather than a silent transition as in most process calculi.
If more then one matching is possible, the receive that needs fewer substitutions is
selected to progress (rules (com) and (parcom)). This mechanism permits to correlate
diﬀerent service communications thus implicitly creating interaction sessions and
can be exploited to model the precedence of a service instance over the corresponding
service speciﬁcation when both can process the same request.
When the delimitation of a variable x argument of a receive is encountered, i.e.
the whole scope of x is determined, the delimitation is removed and the substitution
for x is applied to the term (rule (delcom)); variable x disappears from the term and
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Conditions: Φ, Φ′, . . . Exported private names: Δ, Δ′, . . .
Unknown values: x, y, . . . Variable/Names/Unknown values: u, u′, . . .
Values/Unknown values: v, v′, . . . Variable/Values/Unknown values: w, w′, . . .
Names/Unknown values: n, m′, . . . , p, o, . . . Endpoints/Unknown values: n, m′, . . . , u, u′, . . .
Constrained services: Φ,Δ  s
Services: s ::= kill(k) | u•u′! | g | s | s | {|s|} | [e] s | ∗ s
Receive-guarded choice: g ::= 0 | p• o?w.s | g + g
Table 6
Constrained services
cannot be reassigned a value (for this reason we say that COWS’s variables are
‘write once’). Notably, during the inference of the transition, the length of the
substitution to be applied decreases, while the length  of the initial substitution
does never change, which makes it suitable to check, in any moment, existence of
better matching, i.e. of parallel receives with greater priority. Rule (cong) is standard
and states that structurally congruent services have the same transitions.
Execution of parallel services is interleaved (rule (par)), but when a kill activity
or a communication is performed. Indeed, the former must trigger termination of
all parallel services (according to rule (parkill)), while the latter must ensure that the
receive activity with greater priority progresses (rules (com) and (parcom)).
4 A symbolic semantics for COWS
In this section, we introduce a symbolic operational semantics for COWS. For the
sake of simplicity, here we consider a monadic version of COWS, i.e. communica-
tion activities are of the form u! and n?w.s (we discuss in Section 5 how to tailor the
symbolic semantics to handle polyadic communication). Many illustrative examples
shed light on the technical development.
4.1 Symbolic operational semantics
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is deﬁned over conﬁgurations of
the form Φ,Δ  s, called constrained services and deﬁned in Table 6, where Φ is
the condition that must hold to reach the current state, Δ is the set of private
names previously exported, and s is a service whose actions are determined by Φ
and Δ. The set Δ will be omitted when empty, writing e.g. Φ  s instead of
Φ, ∅  s. We deﬁne the semantics over an enriched set of services that also includes
those auxiliary terms resulting from replacing (free occurrences of) variables with
unknown values in terms produced by the syntax introduced in Section 3, where
now expressions contain also unknown values. In the extended syntax we use x to
denote an unknown value and t to denote an unknown value or a term t (where t
can be n, v, u, w, n or u). Therefore, u •u′! and p •o?w.s denote invoke and receive
activities, respectively.
As in the standard semantics, the only binding construct is delimitation: let
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Φ,Δ  C[[[d] s]] be a constrained service (where C is a context 1 ), [d] binds d in
the scope s, in the condition Φ and in the set Δ. We denote by bn(t) the set of
names that occur bound in a term t, and by uvar(t) the set of variables that have
been replaced by corresponding unknown values in t (i.e. if x is an unknown value
in t, then x ∈ uvar(t)). For simplicity sake, in the sequel we assume that bound
variables in constrained services are pairwise distinct and diﬀerent from variables
corresponding to the unknown values of the constrained services, and bound names
are all distinct and diﬀerent from the free ones (of course, these conditions are not
restrictive and can always be fulﬁlled by possibly using alpha-conversion). This
assumption avoids that distinct unknown values are denoted by the same x in a
condition Φ of a constrained service (see Example “Evaluation function, condition
x ∈ uv and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.2), and permits identifying
the name delimitation binding each private name within a condition Φ and a set Δ
of a constrained service (see Remark 4.1).
The symbolic operational semantics of COWS is deﬁned only for closed services,
and is given in terms of a structural congruence and of a (bi-)labelled transition
relation. The structural congruence ≡ is the trivial extension of that deﬁned in
Section 3 to the enriched syntax of services used here. To deﬁne the labelled tran-
sition relation, we exploit the trivial extension to the enriched syntax of function
halt( ) and predicate noKill( , ) deﬁned in Section 3. We also extend function [[ ]]
to deal with unknown values. Now, it takes a closed expression and returns a pair
(Φ, v): the (possibly unknown) value v is the result of the evaluation provided that
the condition Φ holds. Speciﬁcally, let  be an expression, if  does not contain un-
known values and can be computed, then [[]] = (true , v) where v is the result of the
evaluation, as in the original COWS semantics. Similarly, if  is an unknown value
x, then [[]] = (true, x). If  contains unknown values and is not a single unknown
value (i.e.  = x for every x), then [[]] = ((y = bn ∧ y ∈ uv ∧ y =  ∧ Φ′), y)
where y is a fresh unknown value that must be diﬀerent from all private names (i.e.
y = bn) and from all existent unknown values (i.e. y ∈ uv) 2 , and Φ′ is a condition
that permits dealing with expression operators partially deﬁned 3 . Function [[ ]],
and hence condition Φ′, cannot be explicitly deﬁned because the exact syntax of
expressions is deliberately not speciﬁed. Then, consider as an example the following
simple language for expressions:
 ::= x | x | i |  +  | −  |  ∗  | / | ()
where i is an integer value. For the above language function [[ ]] is such that:
• [[(5 − 2) ∗ 3]] = (true, 9);
• [[5− x]] is undeﬁned, because the expression 5− x is not closed;
1 A context C is a service with a ‘hole’ [[·]] such that, once the hole is ﬁlled with a service s, the resulting
term C[[s]] is a COWS service.
2 Notably, here y can be any unknown value, provide that it satisﬁes conditions y = bn and y ∈ uv. Notice
that condition y ∈ uv is a syntactical condition on the variable name y. Later we shall explain the exact
meaning of the above conditions and show how they are evaluated in the last step of the inference of a
transition.
3 Of course, if all operators used in the considered expression are total functions, then condition Φ′ is true.
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• [[5− x]] = ((y = bn ∧ y ∈ uv ∧ y = 5− x), y);
• [[5/0]] is undeﬁned;
• [[5/x]] = ((y = bn ∧ y ∈ uv ∧ y = 5/x ∧ x = 0), y), where condition x = 0 is
due to the fact that operator / is not deﬁned when its second argument is 0.
We also deﬁne a function confRec( , ), that takes a service s and an endpoint n
as an arguments and returns the set of (possibly unknown) values that are parame-
ters of receive activities over the endpoint n active in s. This function plays the role
of predicate noConf( , , , ) of the standard semantics and, indeed, is exploited to
disable transitions in case of communication conﬂicts (by setting transition condi-
tions to false). The function is inductively deﬁned as follows:
confRec(0, n) = confRec(kill(k), n) = confRec(u!, n) = confRec(n?x.s,n) = ∅
confRec(g + g′, n) = confRec(g, n) ∪ confRec(g′, n) confRec(n?v.s, n) = { v }
confRec(n′?w.s, n) = ∅ if n = n′ confRec({|s|}, n) = confRec(s, n)
confRec(s | s′, n) = confRec(s, n) ∪ confRec(s′, n) confRec([e] s, n) = ∅ if e ∈ n
confRec([e] s, n) = confRec(s, n)\{e} if e /∈ n confRec(∗ s, n) = confRec(s, n)
The labelled transition relation over constrained services, written 
Φ , α
−−−−→, relies
on a labelled transition relation
Φ , α
−−−−→, that is the least relation over services
induced by the rules in Table 7. Conditions Φ and actions α are generated by the
following grammar:
Φ ::= true | false | v = v′ | v = v′ | x = bn | x ∈ uv
| x ∈ {xi}i∈I | x =  | Φ ∧ Φ
′
α ::= n v | n [n] | n w | n  [x ] | nσ  v | k | †
where, now, a substitutions σ can be either the empty substitution ∅ or a substitu-
tion {x → v} that maps the variable x to the (possibly unknown) value v.
The meaning of labels is as follows:
• Conditions: true (resp. false) denotes the condition always (resp. never) satisﬁed,
v = v′ (resp. v = v′) denotes an equality (resp. inequality) between (possibly
unknown) values, x = bn means that the unknown value x must be diﬀerent from
all bound names of the considered service, x ∈ uv means that the set of variables
corresponding to the unknown values of the considered constrained service may
not contain the variable x, x ∈ {xi}i∈I means that x must not be in the set
{xi}i∈I , x =  states that the unknown value x is equal to the evaluation of
the closed non-evaluable expression  (conditions of this form are generated by
the evaluation function, e.g. condition y = 5/x is generated by evaluation of
expression 5/x), and as usual ∧ denotes the logic conjunction. In the sequel, we
will use notation v = {v 1, . . . , v n} to indicate the condition v = v 1 ∧ . . . ∧ v = v n
(where v = ∅ indicates true). Moreover, we will use a function B( , , ) that,
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kill(k)
true , k
−−−−−−→ 0 (s-kill) n?w.s
true , nw
−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
s
Φ , nx
−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-reccom)
[x] s
Φ∧ x =bn∧ x = confRec(s,n) , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x → x}
g
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s
(s-choice)
g + g′
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s
[[]] = (Φ, v )
(s-inv)
n!
Φ , n v
−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ , nn
−−−−−−−→ s′ n /∈n
(s-open)
[n] s
Φ , n [n]
−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ , n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delcom)
[x] s
Φ , n ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−→ s′ ·{x → v}
s
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′
(s-delkill1)
[k] s
Φ , †
−−−−→ [k] s′
s
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′ k = e
(s-delkill2)
[e] s
Φ , k
−−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , †
−−−−→ s′
(s-delkill3)
[e] s
Φ , †
−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′ e /∈ e(α) α = k , † noKill(s, e)
(s-del)
[e] s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ [e] s′
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′
(s-prot)
{|s|}
Φ , α
−−−−−→ {|s′|}
s1
Φ1 , n v
′
−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′
 v
−−−−−−−−→ s′2
(s-match)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n
′ ∧ v′=v , n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
Φ1 , n x−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′
 v
−−−−−−−−→ s′2
(s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n
′ ∧ v = confRec(s1| s2,n) , n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s1
Φ , nσ 1 v
−−−−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parcom1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ v = confRec(s2,n) , nσ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parkill)
s1 | s2
Φ , k
−−−−−→ s′1 | halt(s2)
s1
Φ , n[x ]
−−−−−−−−→ s′1
(s-parcom2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧ x = confRec(s2,n) , n[x ]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s ≡ s1 s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s2 s2 ≡ s
′
(s-cong)
s
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 α = k , nσ 1 v , n  [x ]
(s-par)
s1 | s2
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 7
COWS symbolic semantics (rules for
Φ , α
−−−−→)
given a condition Φ, a service s and a set of variables {xi}i∈I , returns a condition
obtained by conjuncting Φ with all inequalities between the unknown values of Φ
and the bound names of s and with all conditions x ∈ {xi}i∈I for each x ∈ uv in
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Φ. Formally, B( , , ) is deﬁned as follows:
B(true, s, {xi}i∈I) = true B(false, s, {xi}i∈I) = false
B(v = v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v = v
′ B(v = v′, s, {xi}i∈I) = v = v
′
B(x = bn, s, {xi}i∈I) = x = bn ∧ x = bn(s) B(x ∈ uv, s, {xi}i∈I) = x ∈ {xi}i∈I
B(x ∈ {yj}j∈J , s, {xi}i∈I) = x ∈ {yj}j∈J B(x = , s, {xi}i∈I) = x = 
B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s, {xi}i∈I) = B(Φ, s, {xi}i∈I) ∧ B(Φ
′, s, {xi}i∈I)
• Actions: n [n] denotes execution of a bound invoke activity over the endpoint n,
while n  [x ] denotes taking place of external communication over the endpoint
n with receive parameter x (that will be replaced by the unknown value x).
The remaining labels have the usual meaning. Notably, due to the restraint on
monadic communication, here the natural number  can only be either 0 or 1.
We comment on the aspects of the symbolic semantics rules that mainly diﬀer
from the standard ones. Bound invocations, that transmit private names, can be
generated by rule (s-open). Notably, bound invocation actions do not appear in rules
(s-match) and (s-com), and therefore cannot directly interact with receive actions. Such
interactions are instead inferred by using structural congruence to pull name delim-
itation outside both interacting activities. Although the bound transitions and rule
(s-open) can be omitted, we include them both to give a proper semantics to terms
[m] n!m and to support the development of behavioural equivalences for COWS.
Communication can be either internal or external to a service. Internal communi-
cation can take place when two matching receive and invoke activities (rules (s-match)
and (s-com)) are simultaneously executed. External communication can take place
when a value is transmitted to the environment (rules (s-inv) and (s-open)) or when
a receive activity matches an unknown value provided by the environment (rules
(s-rec) and (s-reccom)). Diﬀerently from the standard semantics, conﬂicting receives
cannot be dealt with by using a predicate in the premises of rules for communi-
cation and interleaving, because unknown values can be involved. Here, the check
for conﬂicting receives is simply a condition of the form v = confRec(s, n) (rules
(s-reccom), (s-com), (s-parcom1)) and (s-parcom2)).
The labelled transition relation 
Φ , α
−−−−→ is the least relation over constrained
services induced by the rules reported in Table 8, where notation n /∈ Δ means
that set Δ does not contain the names of endpoint n. Rule (constServ) states that a
constrained service Φ,Δ  s can perform all the ‘non-invoke’ transitions performed
by s with an enriched condition Φ′′ obtained by composing Φ and the condition on
the label Φ′. Condition Φ′′ takes care of the relationship between unknown values
and private names. Indeed, by private names deﬁnition, each unknown value, that
is a value coming from the environment, must be diﬀerent from all bound (private)
names of the considered service. If the transition s
Φ′, α
−−−−→ s′ introduces a new
unknown value x (rules (s-inv) and (s-reccom)), it is not suﬃcient to add the condition
x = bn(s′) (i.e. the unknown value is diﬀerent from all bound names of the current
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s
Φ′, α
−−−−−→ s′ α = n [n] , n v Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′,uvar(Φ))
(constServ)
Φ,Δ  s 
Φ′′, α
−−−−−→ Φ′′,Δ  s′
s
Φ′, n [n]
−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n /∈Δ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′, uvar(Φ))
(constServexp)
Φ,Δ  s 
Φ′′, n [n]
−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,Δ ∪ {n}  s′
s
Φ′, n v
−−−−−−−→ s′ n /∈Δ Φ′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′,uvar(Φ))
(constServinv)
Φ,Δ  s 
Φ′′, n v
−−−−−−−→ Φ′′,Δ  s′
Table 8
COWS symbolic semantics (rules for 
Φ , α
−−−−→)
service), but we need also to consider bound names that could be subsequently
generated. For example, let us consider the following transition:
true  [x] n?x.s | ∗ [n] n′!n 
x =bn∧ x =n , n[x ]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x = bn∧x = n  s·{x → x} | ∗ [n] n′!n
Now, if the obtained service performs the transition:
s · {x → x} | ∗ [n] n′!n
Φ , α
−−−−→ s′ · {x → x} | ∗ [n] n′!n | [n′] n′!n′ | [n′′] n′!n′′
then, let Φ′  s′′ be the obtained constrained service, the condition Φ′ must contain
x = n′ and x = n′′. To update after any transition the condition of a constrained
service with inequalities between unknown values and private names, we use the
condition x = bn, that simply states that x has been introduced in the considered
term (rules (s-inv) and (s-reccom)), and function B( , , ), that adds the inequalities
for each unknown value (rules (constServ), (constServexp) and (constServinv)). Moreover,
function B( , , ) adds conditions of the form x ∈ {xi}i∈I to guarantee that unknown
values introduced by rule (s-inv) because of expression evaluation diﬀer from those
of the considered constrained service (i.e. uvar(Φ) if the constrained service is
Φ,Δ  s; for further details see Example “Evaluation function, condition x ∈ uv
and assumption on bound variables” in Section 4.2).
Rules (constServexp) and (constServinv) deal with the localized receiving feature of
COWS. Indeed, if a COWS term communicates a private (partner or operation)
name to the environment, then the latter (that is a COWS context) may use the
name to deﬁne a sending endpoint, but not a receiving one. For example, consider
the following constrained service:
true  [p] ( q • o!p | p • o′!v )
It can perform the activity q • o!p (rule (s-open)) and become the term true, {p}  p •
o′!v which is stuck. In fact, to further evolve it needs the environment to be able
to perform ﬁrst a receive q • o?x and then a receive along the endpoint x • o′, that
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is disallowed by the syntax. Therefore, to block invoke activities performed along
endpoints using previously exported private names, we record all exported private
names in the set Δ of the constrained service and perform the check n /∈Δ when an
invoke activity along n communicating with the environment is executed.
Remark 4.1 The assumption “bound names are all distinct and diﬀerent from
the free ones” is used to guarantee the correlation between conditions and services.
For example, if we do not rely on this assumption, for the constrained service
x = n  [n] s | [n] s′ we are not able to understand what is the binder for the n
in the condition x = n. In fact, by deﬁnition of bound names, the constrained
service x = n  [n]x • o!n is alpha-equivalent to x = m  [m]x • o!m, not to
x = n  [m]x • o!m.
Remark 4.2 In the deﬁnition of relation 
Φ , α
−−−−→, the conditions are never eval-
uated. Thus, at operational semantics level, we do not distinguish unfeasible
transitions (whose condition holds false) from feasible ones. For example, tran-
sitions having the following conditions are unfeasible: (oreq = oresp), (x = x) and
(x = y ∧ x = y). Of course, to identify unfeasible transitions, we can replace the
condition Φ′′ in the conclusion of rules (constServ), (constServexp) and (constServinv) with
E(Φ′′), where E( ) is a function for evaluating conditions.
Remark 4.3 Since the transition relation 
Φ , α
−−−−→ is deﬁned over constrained ser-
vices, i.e. conﬁguration of the form Φ,Δ  s, the operational semantics can be
naturally interpreted on L2TS [11]. Indeed, each edge label (of the form Φ, α) in-
dicates the condition which must hold for the transition to be enabled and the
performed action, while each state label (of the form Φ,Δ) indicates the condition
which must hold to reach the considered state from the initial one and the set of
previously exported private names.
We can now formalize the correspondence between the original semantics intro-
duced in Section 3 and the symbolic semantics. We exploit here a function E( ) for
evaluating conditions: it takes a condition Φ and returns false if certainly Φ does
not hold; otherwise, it returns Φ. For example, E(Φ′ ∧ (5 = 3)) is false whatever Φ′
may be. Since a condition Φ can be of the form x =  and the syntax of expres-
sions  is not speciﬁed, function E( ) cannot be explicitly deﬁned (like function [[ ]]).
For the proof of semantics correspondence, we use the following lemma concerning
function B( , , ). For the sake of simplicity, a condition Φ is deemed favourable if
uvar(Φ) = ∅ and E(Φ) = false , i.e. it does not contain unknown values and can be
positively evaluated.
Lemma 4.4 Let Φ be a favourable condition, then E(B(Φ, s, ∅)) = false for any s.
Proof. The thesis follows from the fact that, under the considered hypotheses,
B( , , ) acts as an homomorphism on the ﬁrst argument, except when the argument
is x = bn and x ∈ uv. We do not need to consider the former case because, by
the hypothesis uvar(Φ) = ∅, we have that Φ does not contain unknown values. For
the latter case, we get that B(x ∈ uv, s, ∅) = x ∈ uv since the third argument of
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B( , , ) is ∅. 
Our major result is a theorem of ‘operational correspondence’. It is quite stan-
dard and states that for each transition of the original LTS associated to a COWS
term there exists a corresponding symbolic transition of the symbolic LTS that does
not involve unknown values and bound names, and vice versa. Notice that, since the
original semantics does not take bound invocations into account, only constrained
services of the form Φ  s are considered in the theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let uvar(α) = ∅ and α = n  [n] . s
α
−−−→ s′ if and only if, for any
favourable condition Φ, Φ  s 
Φ′ , α
−−−−→ Φ′  s′ for some favourable condition Φ′.
Proof. The proof of the “if” part proceeds by induction on the length of the
inference of s
α
−−→ s′. For the base case, we reason by case analysis on the axioms
of the original operational semantics.
(kill) In this case, α = k, s = kill(k) and s′ = 0. By rule (s-kill), kill(k)
true , k
−−−−−−→
0. Then, by rule (constServ), we get that Φ  kill(k) 
Φ′ , k
−−−−→ Φ′  0, where
Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true,0, ∅) (since uvar(Φ) = ∅). By deﬁnition, B(Φ ∧ true,0, ∅) =
B(Φ,0, ∅) ∧ B(true,0, ∅). Since Φ is favourable, by Lemma 4.4, we have that
E(B(Φ,0, ∅)) = false . Since B(true,0, ∅) = true = false , we can conclude that
E(Φ′) = false .
(rec) In this case, α = n  w and s = n?w.s′. By rule (s-rec), n?w.s′
true , nw
−−−−−−−−→ s′.
Then, by rule (constServ), we get that Φ  n?w.s′ 
Φ′ , nw
−−−−−−→ Φ′  s′, where
Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true,0, ∅). As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) = false.
(inv) In this case, α = n  v, s = n! where [[]] = v, and s′ = 0. By rule (s-inv),
n!
true , n v
−−−−−−−−→ 0. Then, by rule (constServinv), we get that Φ  n! 
Φ′ , n v
−−−−−−→ Φ′ 
0, where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ true,0, ∅). As before, we can conclude that E(Φ′) = false.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule
of the original operational semantics.
(choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (choice), g
α
−−→ s′. By
induction, Φ  g 
Φ′ , α
−−−−→ Φ′  s′ for any favourable Φ and some favourable Φ′.
By the premise of the rule (constServ), we get that g
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′′ is such
that Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By rule (s-choice), g + g′
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ s′. Finally, by rule
(constServ), we can conclude Φ  g + g′
Φ′ , α
−−−−→Φ′  s′.
(delcom) In this case, s = [x] s1 and s
′ = s2 · {x → v}. By the premise of
the rule (delcom), s1
n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s2. By induction, we get that Φ  s1 
Φ′ , n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−→ Φ′  s2 for any favourable Φ and some favourable Φ
′. By the
premise of rule (constServ), we get that s1
Φ′′ , n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−→ s2 and, by rule (delcom),
[x] s1
Φ′′ , n ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−→ s2 · {x → v}. Finally, by rule (constServ), we can conclude.
(delkill1), (delkill2), (delkill3), (del), (cong), (prot), (parkill), (par), (parcom) These cases are
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similar to the previous one; the latter case relies on the fact that
noConf(s2, n, v, 1) = true implies that confRec(s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v = vi
for all i ∈ I.
(com) First, we consider the case α = n ∅ 0 v. By the premises of rule (com), s = (s1 |
s2), s
′ = (s′1 | s
′
2), s1
n v
−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n v
−−−−→ s′2. By induction, we get that
Φ1  s1
Φ′1 , n v−−−−−−→Φ′1  s
′
1 and Φ2  s2 
Φ′2 , n v−−−−−−→ Φ′2  s
′
2, for any favourable
conditions Φ1 and Φ2, and some favourable Φ
′
1 and Φ
′
2. By the premises of rules
(constServ) and (constServinv), we get that s1
Φ′′1 , n v−−−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
Φ′′2 , n v−−−−−−−→ s′2,
where conditions Φ′′1 and Φ
′′
2 are such that Φ
′
1 = B(Φ1∧Φ
′′
1, s
′
1, ∅) and Φ
′
2 = B(Φ2∧
Φ′′2, s
′
2, ∅). By rule (s-com), s1 | s2
Φ′ , n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2, where Φ
′ = Φ′′1 ∧ Φ
′′
2 ∧ n =
n∧v = v. Finally, by rule (constServ), we can conclude that Φ  s1 | s2 
Φ′′ , n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−→
Φ′′  s′1 | s
′
2, where Φ
′′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′, s′1 | s
′
2, ∅). The case α = nσ 1 v proceeds as
above, by also relying on the fact that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) = true implies that
confRec(s1 | s2, n) = {vi}i∈I with v = vi for all i ∈ I.
Consider now the “only if” part of the theorem. By the premises of rules (con-
stServ) and (constServinv), we get that s
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ s′ where Φ′ = B(Φ ∧ Φ′′, s′, ∅). By
hypothesis E(Φ′) = false, hence E(Φ′′) = false too. The proof proceeds by induc-
tion on the length of the inference of s
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ s′. We omit the details because the
proof proceeds as that of the “if” part, but the steps are executed in the reverse
order. For the base case, we reason by case analysis on the axioms of the symbolic
operational semantics. We take a look at one base case:
(s-rec) In this case, Φ′′ = true, α = n  w and s = n?w.s′. Trivially, by rule (rec),
n?w.s′
nw
−−−−−→ s′.
For the inductive step, we reason by case analysis on the last applied inference rule
of the symbolic operational semantics. We take a look at two cases:
(s-choice) In this case, s = g + g′. By the premise of the rule (s-choice), g
Φ′′ , α
−−−−−→ s′.
By induction, we get that g
α
−−→ s′. Finally, by rule (choice), we can conclude
g + g′
α
−−→ s′.
(s-com) In this case, s = (s1 | s2), Φ
′′ = (Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n = n ∧ v = confRec(s1 | s2, n)),
α = n {x → v} 1 v and s′ = (s′1 | s
′
2). Since E(Φ
′′) = false, we get that E(Φ1) =
false , E(Φ2) = false and confRec(s1 | s2, n) = {vi}i∈I such that v = vi for all
i ∈ I. This means that noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, 1) holds true. By induction and since
E(Φ1) = false and E(Φ2) = false, we have that s1
n x
−−−−−→ s′1 and s2
n v
−−−−→ s′2.
Thus, by rule (com), we can conclude that s1 | s2
n {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2. 
4.2 Examples
In this section, we show some simple examples aimed at clarifying some peculiarities
of COWS symbolic semantics. In the sequel, for the sake of readability, we shall
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evaluate conditions, writing e.g. x = n instead of (p = p ∧ o = o ∧ true ∧ x = n).
External communication
According to the operational semantics introduced in Section 3, the service
[x] n?x. m!x is blocked (because it cannot perform the receive activity). Instead,
according to the symbolic semantics deﬁned in this section, the constrained service
true  [x] n?x. m!x can evolve as follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. m!x
true , n x
−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. m!x
x =confRec((n?x. m!x),n)∧ x=bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ m!x
(constServ)
true  [x] n?x. m!x 
x=bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−→ x = bn  m!x
since (x = confRec((n?x. m!x), n)) = (x = ∅) = true. Then, the continuation can
perform the following transition:
[[x]] = (true , x)
(s-inv)
m!x
true , m x
−−−−−−−−→ 0
(constServinv)
x = bn  m!x 
x =bn , m x
−−−−−−−−→ x = bn  0
Notice that, although the external communication generates the condition x = bn
(that means that the received unknown value must be diﬀerent from all delimited
names), the condition is never exploited because the term does not contain delimited
names.
External communication within name delimitations
Consider the constrained service true  [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n. Diﬀerently from the
previous example, the above service contains a delimited name (i.e. n). Thus, this
time, condition x = bn is exploited to generate the speciﬁc condition x = n. Indeed,
the service evolves as follows:
(s-rec)
n?x. x • o!n
true , nx
−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-reccom)
[x] n?x. x • o!n
x =confRec((n?x. x • o!n),n)∧ x=bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x • o!n
(s-delpass)
[n] [x] n?x. x • o!n
x =confRec((n?x. x • o!n),n)∧ x=bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [n]x • o!n
(constServ)
true  [n] [x] n?x. x • o!n 
x =n∧ x =bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x = n ∧ x = bn  [n]x • o!n
since (x = confRec((n?x. x • o!n), n) = true and B(x = bn, ([n] [x] n?x. x • o!n), ∅) =
x = n ∧ x = bn. Then, the continuation can evolve only provided that condition
x = n holds.
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Internal communication
Consider the constrained service true  [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p •o!v ), where p /∈ n. In
this case, due to the delimitation [p] , the receive activity cannot communicate with
the environment, but can synchronize with the internal invoke:
(s-rec)
p • o?x. n!x
true , p •ox
−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
[[v]] = (true , v)
(s-inv)
p • o!v
true , p •ov
−−−−−−−−−→ 0
(s-com)
p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v
Φ , p •o {x →v} 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ n!x
(s-delcom)
[x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p •o!v )
Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ n!x · {x → v}
(s-delpass)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v )
Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ [p] n!v ≡ n!v
(s-cong)
[p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v )
Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−→ n!v
(constServ)
true  [p] [x] ( p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v ) 
Φ , p •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−→ Φ  n!v
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ p = p ∧ o = o ∧ v = confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) ).
Since confRec(p • o?x. n!x | p • o!v, p • o) = ∅, condition Φ holds true.
External and internal communication
Consider the constrained service true  [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ). In this case, both
internal and external communication can take place. Its initial transitions are the
following ones:
(ext. com.) true  [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) 
x =bn , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−→ x = bn  m!x | n!v
(ext. com.) true  [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) 
true , n v
−−−−−−−→ true  [x] ( n?x. m!x )
(int. com.) true  [x] ( n?x. m!x | n!v ) 
Φ , n ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−→ Φ  m!v
where Φ = ( true ∧ true ∧ n = ce ∧ v = confRec(n?x.m!x | n!v, n) ). Since
confRec(n?x.m!x | n!v, n) = ∅, condition Φ holds true.
Conﬂicting receive
Consider the constrained service true  [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ). Due to the presence
of the receive n?v, that has greater priority to synchronize with an invocation n!v,
the receive n?x can communicate with the environment only if the received value is
not v (indeed, confRec((n?v | n?x | n!v), n) = {v} ):
true  [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) 
x=bn∧ x =v , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ x = bn ∧ x = v  n?v | n!v
Other possible transitions are as follows:
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true  [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) 
true , n v
−−−−−−−→ true  [x] ( n?v | n?x )
true  [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) 
true , n v
−−−−−−−→ true  [x] ( n?x | n!v )
true  [x] ( n?v | n?x | n!v ) 
true , n ∅ 0 v
−−−−−−−−→ true  [x] n?x
On constrained services
Consider the (plain) service [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) where n = q • o. It can
perform the following transition:
[x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y )
x =bn∧x =q , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y )
The obtained service can further perform the following transition:
[y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y )
x=q , q •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−→ n?q
Condition x = q of this transition contradicts condition x = q of the previous one,
but the service can however evolve. Instead, by considering constrained services,
we would have:
true  [x, y] ( n?q | n?x | x • o!v | q • o?y ) 
x =bn∧ x =q , n[x]
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
x = bn ∧ x = q  [y] ( n?q | x • o!v | q • o?y ) 
x=q ∧ x=bn∧ x =q , q •o ∅ 1 v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ false  n?q
because x = q ∧ x = q holds false , and the second transition could not be performed.
That’s why we resort to constrained services.
Evaluation function, condition x ∈ uv and assumption on bound variables
Consider the service s  [y, z] ( n!(5 + x) | n?y.s′ | m?z. m′!z′ ), where n, m and m′
are pairwise distinct. If [[5 + x]] = ((r = bn ∧ r ∈ uv ∧ r = 5 + x), r) then
n!(5 + x)
(r =bn∧ r ∈uv∧ r=5+x) , n r
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
Therefore, the constrained service x = bn ∧ x′ = bn ∧ z′ = bn  s can evolve as
follows:
x = bn ∧ x′ = bn ∧ z′ = bn  s 
Φ′ , n ∅ 1 r
−−−−−−−→ Φ′  [z] (s′ · {y → r} | m?z. m′!z′ )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s′′
for Φ′ = B((x = bn ∧ x′ = bn ∧ z′ = bn ∧ r = bn ∧ r ∈ uv ∧ r = 5 +
x), s′′, {x, x′, z′}) = (x = bn ∧ x′ = bn ∧ z′ = bn ∧ r = bn ∧ r /∈ {x, x′, z′} ∧ r =
5 + x). Now, we cannot alpha-convert variable z into r, because we would violate
the assumption that bound variables diﬀer from variables corresponding to unknown
values (in this case, variable z must be diﬀerent from r because r is an unknown
R. Pugliese et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 241 (2009) 135–164158
value occurring in the constrained service). Similarly, if [[5 + x]] = ((z = bn ∧ z ∈
uv ∧ z = 5 + x), z), then the constrained service would become
Φ′′  [z] (s′ · {y → z} | m?z. m′!z′ )
for some Φ′′, and the assumption would be violated again (because the service
contains both z and z). Finally, if [[5 + x]] = ((z′ = bn ∧ z′ ∈ uv ∧ z′ = 5+ x), z′),
i.e. the unknown value returned by the evaluation function is not fresh, then the
condition on the symbolic transition holds false , because z′ ∈ {x, x′, z′} does not
hold.
5 Symbolic semantics for COWS with polyadic commu-
nication
In this section, we present an extension of COWS symbolic semantics for dealing
with polyadic communication. We ﬁrst extend the syntax of invoke and receive
activities as follows: u • u′!¯ stands for an invoke over the endpoint u • u′ with
parameter the tuple of expressions ¯, while p • o?w.s stands for a receive over the
endpoint p • o with parameter the tuple of variables/(unknown) values w and con-
tinuation s. Tuples can be constructed using a concatenation operator deﬁned as
〈a1, . . . , an〉 : 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 = 〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm〉. To single out an element of a
tuple, we will write (a¯, c, b¯) to denote the tuple 〈a1, . . . , an, c, b1, . . . , bm〉, where a¯
or b¯ might not be present. We will use a¯i to denote the i-th element of the tuple a¯
and, when convenient, we shall regard a tuple simply as a set writing e.g. a ∈ b¯ to
mean that a is an element of b¯. Finally, we denote by v(t) the set of variables in t.
The labelled transition relation
Φ , α
−−−−→ over services now is induced by the
modiﬁed rules shown in Table 9 (the remaining ones are those of Table 7, except
for rule (s-match) which we do not need anymore), where:
• conditions can also have the form Φ∨Φ′; we will use x = bn to denote condition
x1 = bn ∧ . . . ∧ xn = bn for x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉;
• action labels are generated by the following grammar:
α ::= n v | n [n¯] v | n w | n [x¯]w | nσ  v | k | †
All the above deﬁnitions shall extend to relation 
Φ , α
−−−−→.
The new rules exploit a modiﬁed version of functions M( , ) and
noConf( , , , ) deﬁned in Tables 3 and 4, now redeﬁned by the rules in Table 10.
The rules in the upper part of the table state that variables match any value, and
two values v and v′ do match only if condition v = v′ holds. When tuples w and
v do match, M(w, v ) returns a pair (Φ, σ), where Φ is the condition so that the
matching holds and σ is a substitution for the variables in w; otherwise, it is unde-
ﬁned. Function noConf(s, n, v, ) now returns a condition that guarantees absence
of conﬂicts for the inferred transition. Basically, noConf(s, n, v, ) exploits function
rec(s, n, v, ) to identify the conﬂicting receives of s, then for each argument w of
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n?w.s
true , nw
−−−−−−−−−→ s (s-rec)
v(w ) = x¯ |x¯ |  1
(s-reccom)
n?w.s
x =bn , n [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s
s
Φ , n [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ y ∈ x¯
(s-delsub1)
[y] s
Φ , n [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {y → y}
[[1]] = (Φ1, v1 ) . . . [[n]] = (Φn, v n )
(s-inv)
n!〈1, . . . , n〉
Φ1 ∧ ...∧Φn , n 〈v1,...,v n〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 0
s
Φ , n v
−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n /∈n
(s-open1)
[n] s
Φ , n [n] v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s
Φ , n [m¯] v
−−−−−−−−−→ s′ n ∈ v n /∈n
(s-open2)
[n] s
Φ , n [〈n〉:m¯] v
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
s1
Φ1 , nw
−−−−−−−−→ s′1 s2
Φ2 , n
′
 v
−−−−−−−−→ s′2 M(w, v ) = (Φ, σ) noConf(s1 | s2, n, v, |σ | ) = Φ
′
(s-com)
s1 | s2
Φ1 ∧Φ2 ∧ n=n
′ ∧Φ∧Φ′ , nσ |σ | v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s
′
2
s
Φ , nσunionmulti{x →v}  v
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′
(s-delsub2)
[x] s
Φ , nσ  v
−−−−−−−−→ s′ · {x → v}
s1
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 α = k , n  [x¯ ]w , n σ  v
(s-par)
s1 | s2
Φ , α
−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , nσ  v
−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, v, ) = Φ
′
(s-parcom1)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ , nσ  v
−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
s1
Φ , n [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 noConf(s2, n, w · {x¯ → x}, |x¯ | ) = Φ
′
(s-parcom2)
s1 | s2
Φ∧Φ′ , n [x¯ ] w
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′1 | s2
Table 9
Operational semantics of COWS with polyadic communication (excerpt of rules)
these receives it determines a condition (i.e. a logical disjunction of inequalities)
that makes the conﬂicting matching between w and v false. Finally, it returns the
logical conjunction of the determined conditions. We use the auxiliary function
gval( ) that, given a tuple w, returns a collection of pairs of the form (x, i), where
x is an unknown value such that w i = x. Notably, if rec(s, n, v, ) = ∅ then func-
tion noConf(s, n, v, ) returns the condition true, because there are not conﬂicting
receives; while, if there is a w ∈ rec(s, n, v, ) such that gval(w ) = ∅, then the func-
tion returns the condition false , because there are not conditions that can make the
conﬂicting matching false.
We end this section with an example aimed at clarifying how pattern-matching
and conﬂict checking functions work. Consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
In this case, the invoke activity n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 can synchronize with each receive ac-
tivity of the term. Firstly, consider the receive n?〈x, y, z〉: its argument 〈x, y, z〉
matches the tuple 〈v1, v2, v3〉 by generating the substitution {x → v1, y → v2, z →
v3}. The other two receive activities are in conﬂict, because they satisfy the match-
ing with the invoke and generate substitutions with fewer pairs than 3. Thus, func-
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M(x, v) = (true, {x → v}) M(v, v′) = (v = v′, ∅) M(〈〉, 〈〉) = (true, ∅)
M(a1, b1) = (Φ1, σ1) M(a¯2, b¯2) = (Φ2, σ2)
M((a1, a¯2), (b1, b¯2)) = (Φ1 ∧ Φ2, σ1 unionmulti σ2)
noConf(s, n, v, ) =
V
w∈ rec(s,n,v,)(
W
(x ,i)∈gval( w ) x = v i ∧ ( gval(w ) = ∅ ⇒ false ) )
rec(n?w.s, n, v, ) =
(
{w } if M(w, v ) = (Φ, σ) ∧ |σ| < 
∅ otherwise
rec(0,n, v, ) = rec(kill(k), n, v, ) = rec(u!¯, n, v, ) = ∅ rec(n′?w.s, n, v, ) = ∅ if n = n′
rec([e] s, n, v, ) = rec(s, n, v, ) if e /∈ n rec([e] s, n, v, ) = ∅ if e ∈ n
rec(g + g′, n, v, ) = rec(g, n, v, ) ∪ rec(g′, n, v, ) rec({|s|}, n, v, ) = rec(s, n, v, )
rec(s | s′, n, v, ) = rec(s, n, v, ) ∪ rec(s′, n, v, ) rec(∗ s, n, v, ) = rec(s, n, v, )
Table 10
Modiﬁed matching and conﬂicting receives rules
tion rec( , , , ) applied to the whole term 4 returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉, 〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉}.
Then, function noConf( , , , ) returns the condition (y′ = v2 ∨ z
′ = v3) ∧ z
′′ = v3.
Hence, a transition of the term is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′ =v2 ∨ z′ =v3)∧ z′′ =v3 , n ∅ 3 〈v1,v2,v3〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Consider now the receive n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉: in this case the matching function returns
condition z′′ = v3 and substitution {x
′′ → v1, y
′′ → v2}. Function rec( , , , )
applied to the whole term returns the set {〈x′, y′, z′〉}, because the only conﬂicting
receive is n?〈x′, y′, z′〉. Thus, the corresponding transition is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
(y′ =v2 ∨ z′ =v3)∧ z′′=v3 , n ∅ 2 〈v1,v2,v3〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉
Moreover, the receive activities can communicate with the environment; in this
case the conﬂict checks are performed by rule (s-parcom2). For example, the transition
4 This means that the last rule applied in the inference is (s-com). Of course, the last rule could be also
(s-parcom1); in this case, two or three conﬂict checks will be performed on subterms of the considered
service.
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corresponding to the execution of n?〈x, y, z〉 is
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
x=bn∧ y =bn∧ z =bn∧ (y′ =y ∨ z′ =z)∧ z′′ =z , n [〈x,y,z〉] 〈x,y,z〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, y′, z′〉 | [x′′, y′′] n?〈x′′, y′′, z′′〉
Finally, as another example consider the following term:
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 | [x, y, z] n?〈x, y, z〉 | [x
′] n?〈x′, v2, v3〉
If we try to infer the transition corresponding to the communication between
n!〈v1, v2, v3〉 and n?〈x, y, z〉, we have that the condition on the transition label is
false , because function rec( , , , ) returns 〈x′, v2, v3〉 and gval(〈x
′, v2, v3〉) = ∅.
6 Related work and concluding remarks
Symbolic semantics and symbolic bisimulation were ﬁrst introduced in [14] by Hen-
nessy and Lin on value-passing process algebras. The symbolic approach has been
then applied to π-calculus in [25] by Sangiorgi and in [5] by Boreale and De Nicola.
Victor has adopted a similar approach in [26] to eﬃciently characterise hyperequiv-
alence for the fusion calculus. A more recent work on a symbolic semantics for a
fusion-based calculus is [7] by Buscemi and Montanari. A revisited symbolic tech-
nique for π-calculus has been recently proposed in [3] by Bonchi and Montanari.
COWS is a process calculus introduced in [17] for specifying and combining
service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. Since its
deﬁnition, a number of methods and tools have been devised to analyse COWS
speciﬁcations, such as a type system to check conﬁdentiality properties [18], a logic
and a model checker to express and check functional properties of services [12], a
stochastic extension to enable quantitative reasoning on service behaviours [23], a
static analysis to establish properties of the ﬂow of information between services
[2], and bisimulation-based observational semantics to check interchangeability of
services and conformance against service speciﬁcations [24]. An overview of some
of the above tools, with an application to the analysis of a case study, can be found
in [19].
We believe that the alternative symbolic operational semantics deﬁned in this
paper can pave the way for the development of eﬃcient model and equivalence
checkers for COWS. In fact, the model checking approach of [12] does not support
a fully compositional veriﬁcation methodology. It allows to analyse systems of
services ‘as a whole’, but does not enable analysis of services in isolation (e.g.
a provider service without a proper client). The symbolic operational semantics
should permit to overcome this limitation that is somewhat related to the original
semantics of COWS which, although based on an LTS, follows a reduction style.
Furthermore, the symbolic operational semantics can be used to improve eﬃciency
of checking the equivalences introduced in [24]. This, of course, requires deﬁning
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alternative characterizations of the equivalences on top of the symbolic transition
system. We plan to pursue these lines of research in the near future, and in particular
to implement the operational semantics and equivalence and model checkers on top
of it.
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